What does each layer assume?
A proof, its commitments, its verifier, and its surrounding authentication can depend on different assumptions. The complete path needs analysis.
Secure finance needs more than a new primitive. It needs a clear threat model, compatible proof systems, and a verification path that holds together.
Three research threads shape the questions around privacy, authenticity, and quantum resilience.
Google-led work published in 2026 revisits quantum resource estimates for elliptic-curve cryptanalysis and uses a zero-knowledge proof to substantiate its results. These are estimates for future capable machines, not evidence of a current break.
Read the 2026 paper ↗The STARK literature develops transparent proof systems with a post-quantum security direction. The precise construction and its assumptions matter; the label “zero-knowledge” alone does not establish quantum resistance.
Read the foundational paper ↗NIST’s ML-DSA and SLH-DSA standards specify lattice-based and stateless hash-based digital signatures respectively. They provide distinct foundations for post-quantum signature design.
ML-DSA / FIPS 204 ↗SLH-DSA / FIPS 205 ↗The integration gap is the question: how do these advances become one coherent verification path for financial applications?
A proof, its commitments, its verifier, and its surrounding authentication can depend on different assumptions. The complete path needs analysis.
Proof size, proving cost, verification time, and deployment constraints determine whether a construction fits its use case.
Key exposure, authorisation, and integration boundaries need explicit treatment. Adding a new verifier does not automatically secure an entire chain.
These questions guide the evaluation of the complete system.
QuantumFin is developing quantum-resistant verification technology and bringing it together with zero-knowledge proofs for secure finance.
Our focus is the connection between the proof and the check: preserving privacy while building a verification foundation designed for quantum threats.
| Research question | Technology area | Evidence to examine |
|---|---|---|
| What stays private? | Zero-knowledge proof systems | Statement, witness, leakage and zero-knowledge model |
| What resists a quantum adversary? | Quantum-resistant verification | Construction, assumptions and security analysis |
| How do the layers compose? | Proof / verifier integration | End-to-end threat model and composition argument |
| What can an app deploy? | Implementation and integration | Reproducible benchmarks and deployment constraints |
The paper will provide the technical account of QuantumFin’s construction, security model, results, and supporting references. Follow its publication status or contact us to discuss the research.
View the paper status ↗A curated starting point for the landscape discussed here. External background reading; inclusion does not imply adoption in QuantumFin’s implementation.
Ryan Babbush et al. · arXiv:2603.28846v2
Why read it: threat estimates, mitigation, and responsible disclosure.Open paper ↗Eli Ben-Sasson, Iddo Bentov, Yinon Horesh & Michael Riabzev · IACR 2018/046
Why read it: transparent proofs and the foundations of STARKs.Open paper ↗NIST · FIPS 204 / ML-DSA
Why read it: a standardized lattice-based signature construction.Open standard ↗NIST · FIPS 205 / SLH-DSA
Why read it: a standardized hash-based signature construction.Open standard ↗4 REFERENCES
A home for QuantumFin papers and technical contributions as they become available. Our first paper is in the publication process.
Zero-knowledge proofs and quantum-resistant verification